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Abstract  
This article evaluates the relationship between the level of corruption in rapidly developing economies and corporate governance processes 
therein.  Previous literature illustrates a strong relationship between corporate governance and corruption and suggests that in countries with high 
levels of corruption, firms lack efficient corporate governance practices.  Similarly, countries with deficient corporate governance practices and low 
levels of compliance to these standards breed corruption leading to a wide range of transparency dilemmas.  This study delves deeper through careful 
examination regarding the level of compliance with corporate governance standards and the pervasive effects of corruption on the governance 
processes of firms with specific regard to rapidly developing economies as well as offering comparisons and similarities of shared characteristics 
among these countries. 
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I. Introduction	  
The primary focus of this study is to 
examine the level of compliance with corporate 
governance standards and the pervasive effects of 
corruption on the governance processes of firms 
with specific regard to rapidly developing 
economies, henceforth RDEs, as well offer 
comparisons and similarities of shared 
characteristics of firms in these countries.  The 
methodology implemented to prove this correlation 
involves analyses and ranking of each profiled RDE 
according to the degree of the perceived level of 
corruption reported by Transparency International 
and the level of corporate governance standard 
compliance as reported by the eStandards Forum 
Financial Standards Foundation which considers (a) 
Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency, (b) 
Institutional and Market Infrastructure, and (c) 
Financial Regulation and Supervision.   
This paper spotlights the following RDEs; 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, 
Thailand, Turkey and United Arab Emirates as they 
represent the premier class emerging markets 
attracting foreign direct investment and increasing 
levels of GDP. These profiled RDE countries 
represent the fastest growing emerging markets.  
RDEs have the ability to attract foreign direct 
investment despite higher levels of corruption 
versus developed economies.  The growth 
experienced by RDEs, with regard to gross 
domestic product and foreign direct investment, 
come such obstacles and hindrances as corruption 
which may be dealt with through effective corporate 
governance. 
Each one of the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) is considered rapidly 
developing economies due to their ever-increasing 
annual growth rates.  What separates an emerging 
market (henceforth “EM”) from a RDE?  The short 
answer is that RDEs grow at faster rates than EMs.  
According to Arnold & Quelch, there are three 
aspects of a country’s economy that make it so 
(Arnold and Quelch, 1998, p. 8):   
“First is the absolute level of economic 
development, usually indicated by the average GDP 
per capita, or the relative balance of agrarian and 
industrial/commercial activity. This overlaps with 
other categorizations such as ‘less developed 
countries’ (LDCs) or ‘Third World Countries’.  
Second is the relative pace of economic 
development usually indicated by the GDP growth 
rate.  Third is the system of market governance and, 
in particular, the extent and stability of a free-
market system…”.   
RDE countries were chosen as they 
represent the premier class of emerging markets, 
attracting significant foreign direct investment and 
increasing levels of GDP.  With this growth come 
such obstacles and hindrances as crime and 
corruption and the challenges that come with 
implementing effective corporate governance 
practices. 
Consequently, the purpose of this paper is 
to determine whether corruption will be lower in 
RDEs that have higher levels of compliance to 
corporate governance standards.  What sets this 
article apart from previous works is that the profiled 
countries represent RDEs specifically.  This 
research holds value to the field of International 
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Business due to the aforementioned analysis of the 
degree of compliance with corporate governance 
standards as well as the extent to which these 
economies share similar characteristics. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the findings in the 
study as well as areas of future study with regard to 
corruption and corporate governance practices. 
II. Review	  of	  Related	  Literature	  
Previous literature illustrates a strong 
relationship between corporate governance and 
corruption and suggests that in countries with high 
levels of corruption, firms do not demonstrate good 
corporate governance practices.  Similarly countries 
with deficient corporate governance practices and 
low levels of compliance to these standards by firms 
breed corruption leading to a wide range of 
transparency dilemmas.  [(Modigliani and Perotti 
(2000), Hellman et.al. (2000), Xun (2002), Wei 
(2000), LaPorta et.al. (2000), Kauffman and Wei 
(2000), Rose-Ackerman (1997), and Gambetta 
(2000)].  Hence, in order to be able to better grasp 
and systematically examine the relationship 
between the level of corruption and corporate 
governance processes in RDEs, it is important to 
integrate two strands of previous literature to this 
study, one on corruption and the other on corporate 
governance.  
First, let’s begin with corruption.  Known 
as “suborno” in Portuguese, “huì” in Mandarin, and 
“bribery” in English, corruption has been a major 
deterrent to prospective multinationals in RDEs 
such as those identified on Boston Consulting 
Group’s “Top 100 Global Challengers”, which are 
profiled in this study:  Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Chile, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab 
Emirates as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BCG, 
2009).  Commerce Secretary, Mickey Kantor, states 
that bribery and corruption represent the number 
one complaint of U.S. executives operating overseas 
(Blustein, 2007).    
Gambetta (2000) explains the word 
'corruption' in several different ways, but in an 
ethical sense corruption refers to humiliation of 
agents due to the deficiency of moral principles. 
According to Gambetta practices such as bribery or 
kickbacks are considered acts of corruption because 
of the virtues they display.  In the practice of 
corruption, Gambetta considers the involvement of 
three agents rather than two, the 'truster', the 
'fiduciary', and the 'corrupter'.   
Hence, corruption is multifaceted.  “There 
are primarily three different types of corruption:  
bureaucratic corruption where officials take bribes; 
political corruption where politicians take bribes 
using their positions of power; and grand corruption 
meaning misuse of public power by heads of states, 
ministers and top officials for private, pecuniary 
profit” (Osbourne, 1997, p. 10).    Corruption may 
also affect other areas such as such as threats to 
defense and national security, environmental 
degradation, and dissatisfaction with the system of 
democracy. There are many forms of corruption 
including bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and 
embezzlement to name a few.  Corruption is more 
prominent in countries where the anti-corruption 
laws are weak, such as emerging markets.  
Managers are more tempted to pay off government 
officials to get what they want to close the deal.  
Causes of such corruption are often 
directly related to the level of development within 
the country.  Emerging market countries typically 
have issues with poor economic policies, deprived 
civil society, low levels of education, and weak 
accountability of public institutions (World Bank, 
1997a, b).  Government contracts may be awarded 
to contractors who are unwilling or incapable of 
completing the work to comply with industry 
standards.  This makes it hard for a country to grow 
and attract foreign direct investment if the 
infrastructure is not improving. 
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On the other hand, Kaufmann and Jin Wei 
(2000) suggest that in the past, political scientists 
pointed out that corruption may improve efficiency, 
especially in developing countries since it is related 
to bribery and gradually leading to "lower effective 
red-tape." Consequently, Kaufmann and Jin Wei 
label the theory as the "efficient grease theory". 
However, other scholars propose that with 
corruption come a variety of consequences such as 
negative economic growth, foreign and domestic 
investment and so forth.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) point out that a country's regulatory 
significance can be exploited by corruption. 
Similarly, in a World Bank study on Transition 
Economies, corruption is defined as the "Major 
institutional constraints on business” where 
conventionally, corruption is defined as the abuse of 
public office for private gain." (Hellman, Jones, 
Kaufmann, and Schankerman, 2000, p. 19).  
Thus, previous studies find that corruption 
is a problem of governance. As a result, the second 
strand of previous literature in this paper is related 
to corporate governance. Cochran and Wartick 
describe corporate governance as an "umbrella term 
that includes specific issues arising from interaction 
among senior management, shareholders, board of 
directors, and other corporate shareholders” 
(Cochran and Wartick, 1988, p. 9).  “Corporate 
governance ensures transparency, full disclosures 
and accountability of companies to all its 
stakeholders” (Fernando, 2009, p. 31).  The 
importance of evaluating corporate governance 
becomes obvious when profitability is questionable 
due to disruptions in operations or having to incur 
additional unforeseen costs due to corruption.   
Corporate governance is ‘typically perceived by 
academic literature as dealing with ‘problems that 
result from the separation of ownership and 
control’.  From this perspective, corporate 
governance would focus on: The internal structure 
and rules of the board of directors; the creation of 
independent audit committees; rules for disclosure 
of information to shareholders and creditors; and, 
control of the management (Fernando, 2009, p. 9, 
OECD, 1997).   
Wu argues “corporate governance is 
among the important factors determining the level 
of corruption and shows that corporate governance 
standards can have profound impacts on the 
effectiveness of the global anti-corruption 
campaign.” (Wu, 2007, p.152). Corporate 
governance specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out 
the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs (OECD, Wu, 2007).  A result of 
such studies has suggested that private firms are 
entwined in the process as they take advantage of 
administrative corruption, become involved in 
public procurement kickbacks and state capture due 
to the economic implications of corruption.   
Generally, in weak states controlling the 
bureaucrats is almost impossible thereby furnishing 
an effectual rule of law becomes impossible as well.  
All of these elements encourage the spread of 
corruption. The authors further argue that having a 
large state intervention in the economy but not 
acknowledging that corruption does in fact exist 
creates the enigma of 'state-capture'.  The authors 
define 'state-capture' as "the effects of firms to 
shape and influence the underlying rules of the 
game (i.e. legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) 
through private payments to the public." (Hellman, 
Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman, p.1, 2000).  
Xun (2002) finds that poor corporate 
governance standards contribute to the proliferation 
of corruption due to damaging the interests of 
investors and reducing existing transparency.  Asset 
diversion, transfer prices and theft are all examples 
of preferential treatment of investors and insiders as 
a result of the corrupt practice of falsifying 
information.  Inevitably, impaired investor 
confidence, exacerbated by inferior corporate 
governance standards and corruption negatively 
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affects the operating performance, raises the cost of 
capital and reduces firm value.   
Yet there are other components within the 
business practices of corporations that encourage 
corruption in RDEs.  In a study entitled "Corporate 
Ownership Around the World," La Porta, Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1998) reference the 1932 archetypal, 
"The Modern Corporations and Private Property," 
written by Berle and Means, to show the ownership 
structure of widely held corporations of the United 
States.  In the theory of Berle and Means, although 
the capital was separated between small 
shareholders, the control was still concentrated 
within the management.  Despite the study being 
done for the United States' corporations, years later, 
this is still unequivocally the case within the 
corporations in RDEs.  The component of 
ownership structure brings in the issue of 
shareholder rights as well as the issue of 
transparency.   
Albeit Perotti and Von Thadden (1998) 
suggest that corporate transparency has both 
strategic advantages and disadvantages; in general 
the outcome of having transparency is usually 
positive.  Perotti and Von Thadden look at 
transparency from a competitive position affecting 
market liquidity and cost information; however, 
when shareholder rights are considered, more 
transparency supports incontestable outcomes. La 
Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) in 
"Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around 
the World," suggest that shareholder protection and 
minority shareholders rights are not considered 
when there is less or no transparency and that the 
issue becomes the 'agency problem' between 
corporate insiders and outside shareholders. The 
interests of those who control the firm can differ 
from the interests of those who supply the firm with 
external finances.  This problem is the principal 
agent problem that derives from the separation of 
ownership and control and from corporate outsiders 
and insiders. 
Although there is no single model of 
corporate governance, the internal and external 
factors that influence firms together influence the 
creation of corporate governance systems.  Usually 
the factors mirror specific market structures, legal 
systems, regulations, and cultural values. These 
factors affect the efficiency and profitability of the 
firms.  Over the years many public and private 
entities attempted to establish standards and norms 
for bettering corporate governance practices.  
Business practices and efficiency are 
greatly impacted by government policies towards 
crime and corruption.   Although crime and 
corruption are present in every country of the world, 
they are quite prevalent in emerging markets, 
henceforth EMs, and RDEs.  Dealing with 
corruption can be costly.  The World Bank “warns 
that corruption is the greatest obstacle for economic 
and social development in developing countries” 
(Pacek, p. 492).  “Agency problems arise within a 
firm whenever managers have incentives to pursue 
their own interests at shareholder expense” 
(Agrawal and Knoweber, 1996, p. 377).  
Undoubtedly, foreign direct investment would be 
adversely affected in areas in which crime and 
corruption were of great concern. Growth rates 
would also decrease as participation in world trade 
and exports decline. 
RDEs share these same characteristics as 
emerging markets (EMs), but to a greater degree. 
EMs share the following characteristics with RDEs:  
rapid industrialization, modernization, privatization 
of state enterprises, robust private sector activity 
and entrepreneurship, liberalization of trade and 
investment, rapidly improving living standards, 
young population, and growing middle class with 
rising economic aspirations” (Cavusgil, 2007, p. 
15).  According to the Economist article, “The New 
Titans”, such countries have a significant role on 
the global economy.  These countries make up more 
than half of the world’s population, roughly 43% of 
GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and 
greater than a third of the world’s energy 
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consumption and exports (and growing) to name 
some major components (Economist, 2006). 
More countries are paying closer attention 
to corporate governance policies as a result of 
financial crises impacting countries to varying 
degrees on a global scale.  Not having efficient 
corporate governance can decrease efficiency of 
operations, increase the cost of a company’s funds, 
and open the door to more corruption.    
“Nonetheless, the impact of corruption on 
business in particular and society in general is such 
that it diverts resources from productive to non-
productive sectors, and makes a few rich at the 
expense of others…Apart from increasing risk and 
the cost of doing business, corruption damages 
investor confidence, stifles economic growth, and 
deters foreign direct investment. Although the 
incidence of corruption varies among countries, 
most studies have ascertained that corruption is 
detrimental to society and business” (Frisch, 1996, 
p. 68). 
For example, Mauro (1995), Kaufmann 
(1997), Tanzi (1998), and Wei, (1997) have 
demonstrated that corruption does have a negative 
effect on economic growth, business development, 
public expenditures, and domestic and foreign 
investment (Zarb, 2007).   “Firms under the 
influence of low quality government tend to have 
complex organizational structures, poor 
transparency and weak corporate governance” (Fan, 
Joseph et. al. 2010, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2009; Jiang, Lee, and 
Yue, 2010, p. 209). 
Further studies (Klapper and Love, 2002) 
find a positive correlation between corporate 
governance structures and country level measures of 
investor protection.  In addition, they suggest that it 
is crucial for firms located in countries with weak 
legal systems to adopt improved corporate 
governance practices.  Since firms located in 
developing countries may have weaker rules, Black 
(2001) suggests that the corporate governance 
structures may have larger effects.  Corporate 
governance is related to firms and firms from these 
EMs and RDEs set standards in the economies of 
these nations. 
Corporate governance mechanisms as well 
as ownership structure, dividend payout, cost of 
external finance, and market valuations have been 
significantly impacted due to variations in home 
country legal structure and the laws designed to 
protect investors, according to a growing body of 
literature valuations [(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Vishny (1999); Klapper and Love, (2002)].   In 
some countries, firms may decline specific 
provisions causing investor protection laws to be 
nonbinding. American Depository Receipts (ADR) 
issuing firms may improve the rights of investors 
through implementing additional provisions to 
facilitate increased disclosure, to institute more 
efficient and effective boards, and to enact 
disciplinary action to ensure the rights of minority 
shareholders. This type of protection and/or the 
responsibility towards the minority shareholders can 
be observed in the Anglo-American system of 
corporate governance, which is usually referred to 
as “outsider system” where there is dispersed 
ownership and dispersed equity markets. Although 
the “outsider system” encourages institutional 
investors to take part in the process, in this system 
the regulations are based on separation of 
ownership and control, the equity markets, and 
information disclosure to public (Clarke, 2007). 
On the other hand, in western and eastern 
European as well as in Asia Pacific countries, the 
“insider system” dominates the scene where the 
system is a self-serving one in which there is 
evidence of a relationship based approach with 
concentrated ownership, bank finance, and 
representation of majority interest (Clarke, 2007). 
Hence, the agency problem is much more of an 
issue in this system. Although in most parts of 
Europe this system is evolving and becoming more 
converged and harmonized, in the EMs and RDEs 
family controlled pyramidal corporate governance 
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structures, and business networks still set the stage 
and create challenges for OECD standards of 
fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency.  However, it is also worth noting that 
there is a wide range of differences between 
corporate governance structures and standards in 
these countries depending on diverse social and 
economic circumstances. 
III. 	  Research	  Method	  
Two key variables were utilized in order to 
determine the influence of corruption on corporate 
governance standards in RDEs:  the perceived 
levels of corruption present in the country as well as 
the standards compliance index rating.  The 
Corruption Perception Index, henceforth CPI, 
values represent the time period of January to 
December of 2009 (Transparency International).  
The corporate governance factors to be examined in 
this study are compiled from a list of “12 Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems”, which 
were developed by the eStandards Forum Financial 
Stability Foundation in 1999 in response to a need 
for a global set of best practices.  These standards 
are divided into three areas:  Macroeconomic Policy 
and Data Transparency, Institutional and Market 
Infrastructure, and Financial Regulation and 
Supervision.  The Foundation monitors and reports 
economic, financial, and political conditions in 
countries across the globe to assess compliance 
utilizing the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
and Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes 
of International Monetary Fund the World Bank 
launched the same year. The Standards Compliance 
Index rating is converted to a numerical score or 
ranking in which higher scores represent the most 
compliance with these standards as reported by 
eStandards. 
The process of a country implementing standards 
and codes is based on six categories:  full 
compliance, compliance in progress, enacted, intent 
declared, no compliance, and insufficient 
information.  The most desired category for any 
country to have is “full compliance” in which they 
have made all information public and transparent 
regarding each standard and the laws and 
regulations are enforced.  The second most 
desirable category is “compliance in progress”, 
which deems that the country has made the relevant 
standards into laws or regulations and are making 
enforcement a priority.  Such information regarding 
these standards has been made publicly available 
and the country is working towards full compliance.  
Acquiring “enacted” status means that most of the 
principles of the relevant standards have been made 
publicly available and have been made into laws or 
regulations, however, enforcing these laws and 
regulations is lacking.  The “intent declared” 
category means that the country has stated that it 
will take the necessary steps to comply with the 
compliance of these standards and declare them into 
laws or regulations. The “no compliance” category 
means that the country has not incorporated any of 
the relevant standards into laws or regulations and 
no enforcement exists.  The final category is 
“insufficient information” in which there simply is 
not enough information publicly available to assess 
the level of compliance.  (eStandards, 2010). 
Based on these aforementioned categories, each 
country is given a score from 0 (representing 
insufficient information) to 10 (representing full 
compliance).  To come up with an overall rating, 
the country is measured on the degree of 
compliance based on the following scale to come up 
with an overall rating:  very high compliance 80-
100, high compliance 60-80, medium compliance 
40-60, low compliance 29-40, and very low 
compliance 0-20.  This would enable countries with 
insufficient information to still obtain a financial 
standards index score with regard to the level of 
compliance with the standards. 
The CPI values range from 0 (no corruption 
present) to 10 (rampant corruption), however, this 
rating was reversed to comply with the other 
variable, Standard Compliance Index rating.  This 
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index ranges from 1 to 100 in which higher scores 
are desirable and represent the best performance.  In 
the case of CPI, lower scores are desirable; 
therefore a score of 2.0 depicting little corruption 
was reversed to 8.0 and multiplied by 8.3 to be on 
the same scale as the standards compliance index. 
IV. Research	  Findings	  
A majority of the profiled RDE countries have 
acquired “enacted” status:  Argentina, Chile, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Russia, Thailand, and Turkey.  Acquiring “enacted” 
status means that most of the principles of the 
relevant standards have been made publicly 
available and have been made into laws or 
regulations, however, enforcing these laws and 
regulations is lacking.  This is certainly a step in the 
right direction, but these countries need to do more 
to improve their level of compliance.  There were 
no profiled RDE countries with “full compliance” 
or “compliance in progress” status.  Developed 
countries are more apt to fit into these two 
categories: “enacted” or “intent declared”.  
Acquiring either rating would certainly assist in 
making these countries more attractive to foreign 
investors.  This study includes three profiled RDE 
countries that have “intent declared” status:  Brazil, 
China, and the United Arab Emirates.  The “intent 
declared” category means that the country has 
stated that it will take the necessary steps to comply 
with the compliance of these standards and declare 
them into laws or regulations.   No profiled RDE 
countries fell in the “no compliance” category, 
however, one country from this study falls under the 
“insufficient information” category, which is 
Kuwait. This country does not have enough 
information publicly available to assess the level of 
compliance.  Kuwait is nevertheless included in the 
study as it still obtained a standard compliance 
rating based on the information it did provide albeit 
rather low despite high inward FDI and a predicted 
2.4% growth rate as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund for 2010.  Kuwait is also included 
due to being identified as a “top global challenger” 
by the Boston Consulting Group for 2009 as 
previously stated.  (eStandards, 2010).  See Table I 
on the following page. 
The profiled RDEs have the following Standards 
Compliance ratings in order from best performance 
to worst performance based on the aforementioned 
criteria:  Hungary (60.83), India (58.33), Chile 
(54.17), Mexico (53.33), Thailand (50.83), Turkey 
(48.33), Malaysia (46.67), Indonesia (43.33), Russia 
(42.50), Brazil (37.5), Argentina (35.00), China 
(25.83), Kuwait (22.50), and the United Arab 
Emirates (20.83).  Based on these ratings, each 
country is ranked with a numerical value denoting 
their level of compliance:  high, medium, low, or 
very low compliance.  The only profiled country 
acquiring a high compliance rating in this study was 
Hungary.  Countries acquiring medium compliance 
include:  India, Chile, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Russia.  Low compliance 
countries included the remaining countries: Brazil, 
Argentina, China, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates.  See Table I below. 
The CPI scores for the profiled RDEs from least 
corruption to most corruption based on a scale from 
1-10 as reported by Transparency International 
(2009) are:  Chile (6.7), United Arab Emirates (6.5), 
Hungary (5.1), Malaysia (4.5), Turkey (4.4), Kuwait 
(4.1), Brazil (3.7), China (3.6), India (3.4), Thailand 
(3.4), Mexico (3.3), Argentina (2.9), Indonesia 
(2.8), and Russia (2.2), as shown on Table I below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Compliance and Corruption Data for RDEs 
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RDE Compliance Level 
Standards 
Compliance Index 
Global Compliance 
Ranking 
CPI 
 
IFDI 
USD billion 
UNCTAD 
Argentina Enacted 35 61 2.9 4.90 
Brazil Intent Declared 37.5 55 3.7 25.95 
Chile Enacted 54.17 27 6.7 12.70 
China Intent Declared 25.83 70 3.6 95.00 
Hungary Enacted 60.83 11 5.1 -5.58 
India Enacted 58.33 18 3.4 34.61 
Indonesia Enacted 43.33 48 2.8 4.88 
Kuwait Insufficient Info. 22.5 73 4.1 0.15 
Malaysia Enacted 46.67 43 4.5 1.38 
Mexico Enacted 53.33 28 3.3 12.52 
Russia Enacted 42.50 49 2.2 38.72 
Thailand Enacted 50.83 34 3.4 5.95 
Turkey Enacted 48.33 40 4.5 7.61 
U.A.E. Intent Declared 20.83 78 6.5 4.00 
This table depicts the level of compliance, the standards compliance index rating 1/100, global compliance ranking, CPI for 2009, and inward 
foreign direct investment for 2009 in billions of U.S. dollars. 
 
 
An important goal of this study is to measure the 
influence of corruption on the level of compliance 
with the standards.  Each country was plotted on the 
following matrix as a result of their Standards 
Compliance Index rating (eStandards, 2010) and the 
CPI score (Transparency International, 2009).  This 
places each country in one of four quadrants in 
which comparisons and similarities may be drawn.   
 
 
 
 
The most desirable quadrant to attain is Quadrant 4, 
held by Chile.  This quadrant represents the most 
compliance with corporate governance standards 
and the least corruption.  See Figure I below. 
 
Figure I:  Conceptual Matrix of the influence of 
corruption on Corporate Governance Standards 
Compliance 
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This matrix depicts the level of corruption (y axis) and compliance with corporate governance standards(x axis).  
The most desirable quadrant would be number 4 as it represents the most compliance and least corruption.  On the 
other hand, the least desirable quadrant is number 1 as it represents the least compliance and most corruption. 
Quadrant 1 
This quadrant is characterized by having the most 
corruption and the least compliance with global 
standards and codes with regard to corporate 
governance thus making it the least desirable 
quadrant to be placed in.  As illustrated in the above 
matrix, both China and Kuwait are in Quadrant 1.  
China holds “intent declared” status and Kuwait 
holds “insufficient information” status.  Both 
countries have low compliance ratings. In China, a 
system of corporate governance has emerged as a 
result of enterprise, legal, institutional and 
regulatory reforms. In January 2001, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China. Based on the "comply or 
explain" principle, the Code has “strictly followed” 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Revisions to the Company Law and Securities Law 
in 2006 have also strengthened minority shareholder 
rights and disclosure requirements for listed firms. 
The publication of the Basic Standard for Enterprise 
Internal Control in 2008, to be implemented over 
time, signals another important step towards 
enhancing corporate governance. However, highly 
concentrated ownership structure, the dominance of 
state-owned enterprises, and the resulting weak 
minority shareholder protection remain as major 
obstacles to develop a corporate governance culture 
in China. Lu et al. also noted that the gap between 
good and poor corporate governance among listed 
companies is significant. Various recommendations 
are being put forth to improve corporate governance 
in China, including speeding up share reform, 
shareholding diversification, reducing government 
intervention in state owned enterprises, improving 
minority shareholder rights, and enhancing board 
structure and responsibility. (eStandardsForum, 
2009) 
      According to the IMF, Kuwait needs to 
address “serious gaps” with regard to corporate 
governance principles (2004), therefore, this 
country has been identified as having insufficient 
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information to establish compliance with the OECD 
principles of corporate governance.  This report 
recommended “strengthening minority 
shareholders’ protection and raising awareness and 
understanding of standards of disclosure, 
governance, the liability of the Board of Directors, 
and the role of auditors” (IMF, 2004).  The Central 
Bank of Kuwait’s listed firms has been 
acknowledged as having adequate basic governance 
arrangements.  The assessment also raised the 
possibility of amending the Commercial Companies 
Law. (eStandardsForum, 2009) 
Quadrant 2 
A vast majority of the RDEs hold Quadrant 2: 
Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, India, Mexico, 
Turkey, Malaysia, Hungary, and Thailand.  All of 
these countries have a medium or low compliance 
rating.  Brazil is the only country with “intent 
declared” status, while all others have “enacted” 
status.  Having enacted status may be a common 
component for this quadrant.  This quadrant is 
characterized as having the most compliance with 
global standards and codes with regard to corporate 
governance however they also have high levels of 
corruption. 
Argentina has achieved low overall compliance 
with international standards and codes and has 
“enacted” status.  There have been serious concerns 
in the recent past about the independence of the 
Central Bank of Argentina and doubts about the 
accuracy of inflation data. Credible implementation 
of Argentina's comprehensive legal framework for 
fiscal transparency remains one of the country's top 
priorities since local accounting standards differ 
from International Financial Reporting Standards.  
In the area of corporate governance, the National 
Securities Commission mandated listed companies 
in October 2007 to annually disclose whether they 
comply with a minimum set of governance 
standards or to explain the reason for not doing so. 
(eStandardsForum, 2009) 
Brazil has “intent declared” (ID) status and a low 
overall compliance with international standards and 
codes.  The 2001 and 2009 reforms of the 
Corporations Law strengthened minority 
shareholders rights and improved standards for 
disclosure, with improved laws on tag-along rights, 
de-listing, non-voting shares, election of board 
members by minority shareholders and private 
arbitration. Brazil has also declared a “comply or 
explain” policy for all listed companies, however, 
weaknesses still persist. The concentration of 
control in the hands of a few shareholders and 
issuance of preferred or non-voting shares is 
prevalent, which to a large extent is due to the 
family controlled ownership structure. Other 
problems range from the poor functioning of 
boards, the disregard of minority shareholders' 
rights to the lack of adequate legal protection to 
investors. (eStandardsForum, 2010)  
Russia has achieved a medium compliance rating 
and “enacted” status.  It has also adopted a 
“comply-or-explain” policy.  The European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had 
assessed Russian corporate governance legislation 
to be in “high compliance” with OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance in 2004.  However, it is 
important to note that there is still an exorbitant 
amount of state intervention in the economy and 
pervasive corruption in Russia, which creates a 
difficult obstacle to overcome with respect to 
improving the country’s corporate governance as 
noted by the Institute of International Finance’s 
2004 Task Force Report on Corporate Governance.  
A significant regulation issued by the Federal 
Financial markets Service (FFMS) required listed 
companies to enforce the Code of Corporate 
Governance Conduct and publish financial 
statements that conform to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards in an attempt at 
improving transparency. (eStandardsForum, 2010) 
      Thailand also has “enacted” status and a 
medium compliance rating with a “comply-or-
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Corporate Governance Association, the updated 
code follows recommendations by the World Bank 
and the OECD and that the overall practices were at 
a satisfactory level.  Despite these improvements, 
however, it is still noted that the legal enforcement 
of the new codes remains a challenge.  In March of 
2006, a 2009 International Monetary Fund report 
emphasizes that the 2005 World Bank 
recommendation on shareholder protection should 
be implemented into securities laws and that the 
enforcement authority of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission should be strengthened. 
(eStandardsForum, 2009) Hungary is the highest 
performer out of all profiled RDEs holding 
“enacted” status as well as a high compliance 
rating.  In its 2003 Corporate Governance Sector 
Assessment Project, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) observed 
that corporate governance legislation in Hungary is 
in "high compliance" with the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Principles of Corporate Governance. A World Bank 
assessment conducted the same year confirmed that 
the Hungarian regulatory and legislative framework 
with regard to corporate governance is "robust." 
Two more EBRD reports published in 2008 strike a 
similar note, finding that the Hungarian capital 
market and corporate governance frameworks are in 
line with best international practice. Nonetheless 
key deficiencies identified by the reports remain, 
especially regarding the enforcement of corporate 
governance provisions. For instance, per the EBRD 
reports, while minority shareholders receive 
equitable treatment, the enforceability of minority 
shareholders rights, related party transactions and 
efficiency of redress actions are areas of particular 
concern. (eStandardsForum, 2009). 
     Malaysia has attained “enacted” status and 
is medium compliance with standards and codes.  In 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis, steps have 
been taken to improve accounting transparency and 
corporate governance in Malaysia. According to the 
World Bank's 2005 Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) on corporate 
governance in Malaysia, the incidence of 
concentrated shareholding is very pronounced in the 
Malaysian market, particularly through pyramid 
structures. Furthermore, companies are usually 
majority-controlled by a small group of related-
parties and managed by owner-managers. 
Weaknesses exist with regards to the overlapping 
authority of the regulatory institutions governing 
the: securities market, the government's high level 
of equity ownership, low free float, weak protection 
of minority shareholders, and directors' 
accountability. In this regard, it was advised to: 
enforce disclosure and reporting requirements in a 
continuous and consistent manner, to strengthen 
directors' independence and accountability to 
investors, and to enhance the role of institutional 
investors and shareholder activism in the corporate 
governance framework. (eStandardsForum, 2009)  
      Turkey has achieved a medium 
compliance rating and “enacted” status.  Turkish 
corporate governance is characterized by 
concentrated ownership with family-owned 
company groups and cross-ownership between 
companies. While corporate governance in Turkey 
is improving, key issues remain as the ownership 
structure is still composited within the business 
groups (BGs) and the ownership is still pyramidal 
as well as consolidated within families, which are 
the primogeniture shareholders that dominate the 
decision-making process based on insider 
expropriation (Yurtoglu, 2000). However, a joint 
study conducted by Standard and Poor's and the 
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey in 2008 
found that the legal and regulatory framework in 
Turkey regarding corporate governance standards 
and their enforcement had drastically improved. 
Overall the EBRD finds Turkey’s law on the books 
to be “generally good,” but improvements are still 
needed, particularly in the areas of shareholder 
rights and the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance. The report recommended that 
shareholders be enabled to participate more 
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effectively in meetings and that stakeholders be 
offered access to corporate information and specific 
independent committees. (eStandardsForum, 2010) 
      India has attained “enacted” status and is 
reported to be in medium compliance.  The World 
Bank in its 2004 Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) on Corporate 
Governance practices in India acknowledged that 
considerable efforts had been made to reform the 
corporate governance framework and to improve 
the accountability/responsibility of insiders, fairness 
in treatment, board practices, and transparency. The 
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) in 1992 has been described as the 
single most important event with respect to investor 
protection in India. However, significant 
weaknesses in the enforcement of provisions exist, 
particularly with respect to insider trading and 
related party transactions. This is, in part, attributed 
to some regulatory overlap between SEBI and the 
Ministry of Company Affairs. Other weaknesses 
identified include constraints to participation in 
Annual General Meetings and the need for 
corporate governance codes for unlisted companies. 
(eStandardsForum, 2009).  In India, bank 
monitoring may also lead to less public 
transparency, which in turn encourages low level of 
trading liquidity and discourage aggregation of 
information by investors (Perotti and Von Thadden, 
1998).   
      Indonesia also has “enacted” status and 
medium compliance and has been described as 
having an elaborate system of corporate governance 
rules. The ROSC notes that actual corporate 
governance practices in Indonesia often fall short of 
OECD's recommendations. Business culture in 
Indonesia is based on relationships rather than rules, 
largely as a result of the high incidence of 
concentrated ownership, family-owned businesses, 
a weak capital market, and controlling shareholders. 
It further advised establishing nomination 
committees and a cumulative voting system, 
ensuring disclosure and transparency in annual 
reports and financial statements, and improving the 
roles and responsibilities of the audit committees. A 
2006 OECD report, “Implementing the White Paper 
on Corporate Governance in Asia” states that 
awareness of the importance of corporate 
governance has increased considerably in Indonesia. 
Regulations regarding roles of independent 
commissioners (supervisory directors) have been 
introduced to improve board practice and strengthen 
the protection of non-controlling shareholders. 
(eStandardsForum, 2009) 
      Mexico has achieved medium compliance 
and “enacted” status.  According to the World Bank 
and the Institute of International Finance, major 
progress had been achieved by Mexico in 
establishing a successful structure and culture for 
good corporate governance. The World Bank rated 
most principles as either “largely observed” or 
“partially observed,” indicating either only minor 
shortcomings or a legal and regulatory framework 
that complies with the principles, but suffers from 
diverging practices and a lack of enforcement. The 
country was cautioned that real progress in 
corporate governance has to account for the 
concentrated ownership and control structure of 
many Mexican firms. Mexican business 
environment is still characterized by concentrated 
ownership, interlocked boards of directors, 
inadequate insider trading enforcement, and an 
overall poor protection of minority investors. 
(eStandardsForum, 2010) 
Quadrant 3 
Countries in Quadrant 3 are characterized as having 
the least amount of corruption and the least amount 
of compliance to global standards and codes with 
regard to corporate governance.  The United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) is the only profiled RDE country in 
this quadrant holding “intent declared” status and a 
low compliance rating.  The United Arab Emirates 
Code of Corporate Governance was created by the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority for 
listed companies in May of 2007.  The Abu Dhabi 
 
 
 
 The Influence of Corruption on Corporate Governance Standards: Shared Characteristics of Rapidly Developing 
Economies 
Emerging Markets Journal | P a g e  | 33 
Volume 2 (2012)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2012.17  |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
Securities Exchange, the Dubai Financial Market 
and the UAE Ministry of Economy have produced 
and circulated draft corporate governance 
guidelines and regulations. Corporate governance 
codes and guidelines are also promoted throughout 
the region. As the capital markets strengthen and 
mature in this country, the IMF is encouraging their 
authorities to “allow foreign investors to fully 
access the securities markets by removing 
restrictions on stock ownership and board 
membership. It added that the authorities should 
foster the public listing of large, quasi-public 
companies on the stock exchanges to help develop 
the market” (IMF, 2007).  “A new Companies and 
Commercial Activities Law is expected to be 
introduced at the end of 2008, allowing 100 percent 
foreign ownership of companies in some sectors 
outside the free trade zones” (eStandardsForum, 
2008). 
Quadrant 4 
This is the most desirable quadrant, which is 
characterized by having the least corruption and 
most compliance to global standards and codes with 
regard to corporate governance.  Chile is the only 
profiled RDE in this quadrant attaining “enacted” 
status and a high level of compliance.  According to 
a 2003 World Bank assessment of Chilean 
corporate governance practices, Chile scores well 
on the assessment on compliance with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) principles. Nonetheless, 
certain weaknesses were identified and the World 
Bank made policy recommendations in three broad 
areas relating to legislative reform, institutional 
strengthening, and voluntary/private initiatives. The 
World Bank recommended amending the legislative 
framework to achieve greater transparency and 
strengthening the market surveillance mechanisms. 
Improvements in the general enforcement of 
investor property rights were also suggested. 
Ownership is highly concentrated and that minority 
shareholder dissatisfaction is "substantial", 
however, Chile has been taking initiatives to 
achieve greater convergence with international 
practices. Law No. 19,705 known as the Corporate 
Governance Law was introduced in 2000 with the 
main goal to protect minority shareholder rights in 
Chilean companies, especially during changes in 
corporate control. (eStandardsForum, 2008) 
V. Concluding	  Remarks	  
Entrepreneurship is abundant and even thriving in 
RDEs despite obvious corruption and varying levels 
of compliance with corporate governance standards.  
The race to provide the infrastructure necessary for 
these businesses to prosper is well under way to 
ensure business efficiency.  Assurances of 
safeguards to protect valuable assets of 
multinationals must be in place in order to continue 
to attract and retain foreign direct investment in 
these countries.  
      The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
Report on Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) on Corporate Governance practices advise 
many of the profiled countries to enforce disclosure 
and reporting requirements in a continuous and 
consistent manner, to strengthen directors' 
independence and accountability to investors, and to 
enhance the role of institutional investors and 
shareholder activism in the corporate governance 
framework (eStandardsForum, 2009).  A majority 
of the leading firms in the profiled countries are 
family-controlled companies and have elaborate 
systems and rules governing their principles of 
corporate governance.  The World Bank also 
suggests improving the effectiveness of 
implementation and enforcement of legislation and 
regulations to improve the corporate governance 
framework (eStandards, 2010). 
      Zarb’s study found that a relationship 
existed between corruption, credible financial 
reporting, as well as government intervention 
(2007).  This emphasizes the necessity of adequate 
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disclosure and accurate financial records to ensure 
transparency.  According to Zarb, disclosure not 
only increases transparency, but also increases firm 
value which in turn increases stock prices and 
reduces agency costs. Therefore, Zarb asserts that 
increased disclosure levels may lead to increased 
credibility and less corruption (2007).   
      “Corruption is corrosive to development”, 
as stated by James Wolfensohn, President of the 
World Bank (Gloster-Coates & Quest, p. 3).  Year 
after year the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have demonstrated the fact that 
corruption “deters investment and retards growth”, 
which RDEs depend on (IMF, n.p.).  The key 
findings of this paper clearly demonstrate a 
relationship between levels of corruption and their 
effects on corporate governance practices present in 
RDEs.  Corruption has not been consistently lower 
in RDEs that have higher levels of compliance to 
corporate governance standards.  Also, it was 
evident that RDEs, similar in many characteristics 
that endear them to such a term indeed cluster with 
specific regard to their level of such aforementioned 
compliance and levels of perceived corruption.  The 
best way to maintain foreign direct investment to an 
already attractive location in terms of future growth, 
specifically RDEs, would be to find a way to 
safeguard their investments against corruption and 
enact effective and efficient corporate governance 
standards.   
VI. Future	  Research	  
Future studies may involve researching the 
corporate governance structures of the leading firms 
identified as “Top Global Challengers” by the 
Boston Consulting Group, as well as, how the 
significance of these structures enable and/or 
sustain such growth.  Furthermore, future studies 
may also probe the evolution of insider and outsider 
corporate governance systems in Eastern Europe or 
Asia, for example, and discuss the variations and 
differences in these structures as well as explore 
their standardization.
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